![]() First, predicted data would be verified as the test programs were planned. The test program was structured in several phases. The primary test objective of the next phase of the LWF program was to determine the potential operational usefulness of the LWF and its advanced technological features. The difference in the contract awards can be traced to the Northrop design having two engines. ![]() Northrop was awarded $39,878,715 for two Model 600s. ![]() Accordingly, General Dynamics was awarded $37,943,000 for two Model 401s. Following a conference with Stewart and a further detailed analysis of the top three contenders, Seamans elected to proceed with the prototyping and flight testing of the General Dynamics and Northrop designs. The SSA’s conclusion was partly based on the fact that the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were very similar thus to satisfy one of the main objectives of the prototype concept (validation of emerging technologies on two different designs), the decision was made to award the second contract to Northrop instead of the Boeing design.Īir Force Secretary Robert Seamans made the final decision. The Northrop airplane came in second, and the Boeing airplane third. ![]() Members of the Source Selection Authority board analyzed the findings of the preliminary analysis panel and, after some revision, determined the General Dynamics airplane to be the first choice. James Stewart, Commander of Air Force Systems Command’s Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. On 18 March, the results were delivered to the Source Selection Authority headed by Lt. The Lockheed Model CL-1200 Lancer design was a distant fifth. Northrop’s twin-engine Model P-600 design followed in third place. The General Dynamics Model 401 design was a close second. A preliminary analysis concluded that the Boeing Model 908-909 design was the number one contender. The proposals were delivered to the Air Force on 18 February 1972. Five of the nine companies responded: Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Northrop, and Vought. General requirements in the RFP included a high thrust-to-weight ratio, good transonic maneuverability, a simple avionics and fire control system, a minimum load factor of 6.5 g, a suggested gross weight of 20,000 pounds, and a suggested unit flyaway cost of no more than $3 million (in 1972 dollars and based on a buy of 300 aircraft at a rate of 100 aircraft per year). The initial competition was, in effect, a wind tunnel flyoff and proposal evaluation. Each response was to include wind tunnel data and a scale model for further wind tunnel testing. RFP responses were limited to a maximum of fifty pages to describe the aircraft and test program plus ten pages to address cost and management. The RFP was short, just twenty-one pages, and contained performance and cost goals, but very few traditional design specifications. The Air Force request for proposals for the LWF program was released to nine aerospace manufacturers on 6 January 1972. To this end, emphasis was placed on small size, low weight, low cost, advanced technologies, and aerodynamic innovations. This objective was to be achieved within the constraints of system cost, complexity, and utility. The LWF design objectives were to maximize usable maneuverability and agility in the air combat arena at a minimum of 500 nautical miles from base. The political rationale for the LWF was to have an airplane that would complement the McDonnell Douglas F-15. The ADF program, combined with Boyd’s efforts, led to an even more aggressive program for reducing the size and improving the combat maneuverability of fighter aircraft-the Lightweight Fighter, or LWF, program. John Boyd developed his theory of Energy Maneuverability with particular emphasis on smaller, more maneuverable fighters. The US Air Force attempted to counter these trends with a program called the Advanced Day Fighter, or ADF, which had the goal of developing a 25,000-pound fighter with a thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading sufficiently high enough to maintain a twenty-five percent superiority over the MiG-21. Later on, the exchange ratio decayed to slightly better than 1.5 to 1, which, to a large extent, was the result of a shift in emphasis to early generation air-to-air missiles and away from aircraft maneuverability. In 1965, the combat exchange ratio, at best, was 3.3 to 1 compared to 10 to 1 during the Korean War. The concept of a low-cost, high-performance fighter evolved as a consequence of the marginal air-to-air combat effectiveness experienced by US fighters in Vietnam against small fighters such as the Russian-designed and built MiG-17 and MiG-21.
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